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Abstract: In his recent paper, “What
a Real Argument is,” Ben Hamby
attempts to provide an adequate
theoretical account of “real”
arguments. In this paper I present
and
evaluate
both
Hamby’s
motivation for distinguishing “real”
from non-“real” arguments and his
articulation of the distinction. I
argue that neither is adequate to
ground a theoretically significant
class of “real” arguments, for the
articulation fails to pick out a stable
proper subclass of all arguments that
is simultaneously both theoretically
relevant and a proper subclass of all
arguments.

Résumé: Dans son récent article,
«What a Real Argument is», Ben
Hamby tente de fournir une explication théorique adéquate des
arguments «réels». Dans cet article,
je présente et évalue la motivation
de Hamby pour distinguer les
arguments «réels» des arguments
"non-réels" et pour communiquer
cette distinction. Je soutiens
qu’aucune de ces motivations est
suffisante pour justifier une classe
théoriquement
importante
d'arguments «réels», car il ne réussit
pas à identifier une sous-classe
appropriée stable de tous les
arguments qui est en même temps à
la fois théoriquement pertinente et
une sous-classe appropriée de tous
les arguments.
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1. Introduction
Are “real” arguments a theoretically significant subclass of
arguments? In “What is a ‘Real’ Argument?” I extensively
argued “no”. However, given the difficulties of conclusively
proving a negative, I left open the challenge to advocates of
“real” arguments to provide a viable articulation of the notion of
“real” argument. In “What a Real Argument Is”, Ben Hamby
takes up that challenge. He offers both a motivation for the
notion of “real” argument and a proposed articulation.
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In what follows, I present and evaluate both the
motivation and the articulation. I shall argue that neither is
adequate to ground a theoretically significant class of “real”
arguments. I begin with the motivation.

2. The Motivation
Why bother trying to distinguish, within the class of genuine
arguments, so called “real” arguments from non-“real”
arguments? Traditional answers have included demarcating the
subject matter or scope of informal logic or showing the
shortcomings of formal logic. According to Hamby, however,
“real” arguments “serve the important theoretical use of
demarcating the arguments that should be studied in a basic
reasoning course”(Hamby 2012, p. 313). But why think that
demarcating the arguments that should be studied in a basic
reasoning course is a theoretical use of the distinction? A
correct theory of arguments could articulate the ontology and
types of arguments even if, for perhaps bizarre sociological
reasons, there were no basic reasoning courses. But then, if the
theory had a reason for distinguishing “real” and “unreal”
arguments, it would not be to identify “the arguments that
should be studied in a basic reasoning course.”
Granted, if there is a legitimate distinction between
“unreal” and “real” arguments, and “real” arguments meet the
pedagogical demands of basic reasoning courses, then there
would be pedagogical reasons to focus on “real” arguments in
such courses. Of course, if “real” arguments did not meet the
pedagogical demands of basic reasoning courses, then there
would be pedagogical reasons not to focus on such arguments.
Either way the legitimacy of the distinction is prior to the
determination of the focus of basic reasoning courses. In
addition, the determination of focus is ultimately determined by
the pedagogical demands and not the theoretical legitimacy of
the distinction.
But suppose the distinction is theoretically illegitimate.
Would that be enough to delegitimize any pedagogical use of
the distinction regardless of pedagogical demands? If it would,
then granting a legitimate pedagogical role to “real” arguments
means there is some theoretically legitimate underpinning.
Indeed, towards the end of his paper, Hamby writes: “if there is
a legitimate pedagogical use for the distinction, then we should
hope that that distinction pulls some theoretical weight”(Hamby
2012, p. 323).
© G.C. Goddu. Informal Logic, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2014), pp. 62-76.
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I flat out deny the conditional. Legitimate pedagogical
uses need not be grounded in accurate theory. For example,
there is a very pedagogically useful class of frictionless inclined
planes in physics classes, but such planes have no theoretical
place at all. No adequate physical theory suggests there are such
entities. In fact our best physical theories suggest that such
entities are impossible. Regardless, getting students to begin
initial calculations of accelerations or forces while ignoring
friction is pedagogically useful. Pedagogically we may
distinguish between high premise arguments and low premise
arguments (and pedagogically prefer the latter), but there is no
theoretical relevance to typing arguments by the number of
premises.
Suppose there is a roughly delineated class of arguments
that could be pointed to, for pedagogical reasons, as the proper
basis of critical thinking or basic reasoning courses. Should (or
must) our theory of arguments include a demarcation of such
arguments? Not necessarily.
Firstly, Hamby acknowledges that not all “real”
arguments are good candidates for a basic reasoning course.
“Such arguments could be considered pedagogically unattractive
because they require too much knowledge even to get off the
ground”(Hamby 2012, p. 318). I also suspect that there are
pedagogical reasons for using allegedly, prospectively unusable
arguments to make an educational point—for example, one
might use a bizarre example such as, “If Socrates is a chicken,
then Socrates has feathers; Socrates has feathers, so Socrates is a
chicken”, to get students to focus on the form rather than the
content. Because the content is bizarre or absurd, students
discount it as the relevant feature and focus instead on the
pattern of reasoning—exactly what might be desired in an initial
presentation of the fallacy of affirming the consequent.
So the class of arguments that should be the focus of a
basic reasoning course is certainly smaller than the class of
“real” arguments, and some of the arguments presented in such a
course may, for pedagogical reasons, be outside the bounds of
“real” arguments altogether. Hence, pointing to arguments that
should be the focus of a basic reasoning class as the motivation
for a theoretical subclass of “real” arguments is inconclusive at
best.
Secondly, there are pedagogical reasons for selecting
certain arguments as the target of analysis in a basic reasoning
class rather than others. Complexity and background knowledge
required for understanding are certainly relevant criteria. I
strongly suspect that “likelihood of use in contexts of relevance
© G.C. Goddu. Informal Logic, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2014), pp. 62-76.
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to our students” could be added as a selection criterion. I suspect
that we can, for the most part, easily distinguish those arguments
more likely to see use from those less likely to see use. But none
of these pedagogical criteria are themselves theoretically
relevant. Our theory of arguments need not distinguish complex
arguments from non-complex arguments1, or distinguish
arguments requiring significant background knowledge from
those that do not. Arguments about the secession of Quebec may
be relevant for Canadian students and so get chosen for
inclusion in a Canadian critical thinking class, but not at all
relevant for American students and so not get selected for an
American critical thinking class. But again, we are not thereby
led to believe that there is a theoretically significant distinction
between arguments about the secession of Quebec and those not,
or between arguments relevant to Canadian students and those
relevant to American students. More generally, since the
pedagogical criteria themselves do not appear to be theoretically
relevant distinctions, we should not think that a class of
arguments that satisfies the pedagogical constraints is a
theoretically relevant class of arguments.
To sum up, I am not moved by the pedagogical
motivation that Hamby offers. While we want what we teach to
be ultimately grounded in the truth, we quite legitimately
idealize and simplify that truth in order to get our students
firmly directed towards it. Hence, pointing at a potentially
legitimate pedagogical distinction does not necessarily indicate
that a theoretically legitimate distinction lurks underneath.
Additionally, we can delineate a rough and ready class of
arguments for basic reasoning or critical thinking classes on the
basis of criteria such as “not requiring too much background
knowledge”, “having a certain level of complexity”, “having
prospective use”, or “being relevant to our students”, etc.,
without our theory of arguments demarcating a subclass of
arguments that are the “real” ones.
Even though we should not be moved by Hamby’s
motivation for making the distinction, Hamby may still have
provided a distinction that can serve as a theoretically legitimate
There is a (contentious) theoretical use of ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ with
regards to arguments that should not be confused with pedagogical
judgments concerning argumentative complexity. A ‘simple’ argument is
one with a single conclusion, but some of those arguments can be too
convoluted and complex for a basic reasoning course. A ‘complex’
argument is one composed of multiple simple arguments interconnected
in various ways, but many of these are straightforward enough for
inclusion in a basic reasoning course.
1
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distinction between “real” and “unreal” arguments. I turn to his
proffered distinction in the next section.

3. The Articulation
According to Hamby “a real argument … is a practical
argument, in the sense that it serves or could serve as a tool of
persuasion or for some other use in the context of the
communicative practice of establishing good candidates for
belief and action”(Hamby 2012, p. 321). He also describes
“real” arguments as “prospectively useful” arguments where “an
argument has prospective usefulness when it could be offered in
practice to support a controversial candidate claim that calls for
judgment in the context of deciding what to believe or do”(p.
313). Hamby claims these sorts of arguments “matter to people
substantively”(p. 313), “are relevant arguments with conclusions
that matter to people in substantive ways” (p. 314), and are
“non-trivial arguments that matter in real-life”(p. 314). These
arguments are to be contrasted with the arguments “that are not
used, nor could prospectively be used, to some end of
argumentation in the practice of forming beliefs and deciding
what to do”(p. 324).
“Real” arguments then are substantial, relevant, nontrivial, matter in real life, and involve controversial claims.
Since these descriptors are not synonyms there is already a
problem of demarcation. Is satisfying all the descriptors a
requirement for an argument to be “real” or must an argument
merely satisfy at least one? Even if we suppose that an argument
that satisfies none of the descriptors is definitely not a “real”
argument, and one that satisfies all of them definitely is “real”,
we still will not know what to do with mixed cases. In an
uncontested theocracy, the conclusion ‘God exists’ will be
uncontroversial, yet still substantial. Whether Mozambique will
ever invade Zimbabwe may be substantial, yet irrelevant to our
concerns. Whether objects can be dispensed with in favor of
properties in a logical model may be controversial, but will not
matter in real life. Are the arguments in these cases “real” or
not? Given that we want our theoretical categories to be
exhaustive, for any argument we should, in principle, be able to
tell whether it is “real” or not—so far this is not true of Hamby’s
articulations.
Suppose, however, that the status of the mixed cases is
clarified. Regardless, whether a conclusion or argument is
substantial, controversial, relevant, or matters in real life
© G.C. Goddu. Informal Logic, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2014), pp. 62-76.

Why We Still Don’t Know What a “Real” Argument Is

67

depends upon our interests and goals. Whether concrete physical
objects are metaphysically real is controversial and matters to
(some) philosophers, but is irrelevant to most everyone else.
Whether two angels can occupy the same space was a
substantial issue for Aquinas, but was inane from the
perspective of critics of scholasticism. Arguing for the
conclusion that “the whole is greater than its parts” would have
been considered an exercise in triviality for centuries, but post
Cantor and Dedekind arguing for it would be controversial.
What is substantial, relevant, or controversial to one person may
not be so to another. But if, say, “being substantial” is a criterion
of “real” arguments, then an argument can be “real” for one
person and not “real” for another. Our theory of arguments
should eschew such relativistic categories. We do not want our
theoretical ontology to be determined by our interests and goals;
we are supposed to discover and articulate the way the world is,
not the way we want it to be.
One option for the advocates of “real” arguments is to
claim that there is an objective category of “substantial”
arguments or “relevant” arguments. Aquinas was either giving a
substantial argument concerning angels occupying the same
space or he was not, and if he was not then he was not giving a
“real” argument. (I admit that what the objective basis for an
argument “being substantial” might be is beyond me.) Another
option is to claim that arguments are “real” if they are
substantial or relevant or controversial for even one individual.
Unfortunately for the advocates of “real” arguments, both
options run into difficulties once we add in the “actually used”
or “prospectively used” aspects of Hamby’s proposed
distinction. I begin with “actually used”.
Does an argument that is actually used in the practice of
forming beliefs and deciding what to do (or persuading others in
this regard) automatically count as a real argument? On the one
hand Hamby should say “yes” since non-“real” arguments are,
according to him, those that are not used nor could prospectively
be used to some end of argumentation. Since they actually are
used, the arguments count as “real”. But on the other hand “real”
arguments are supposed to support controversial candidate
claims, or be non-trivial arguments that matter in real life, or
have conclusions that matter to people in substantive ways. In
the latter case, genuine arguments that have actually been used
to argue for uncontroversial claims or that do not matter to
people (despite what the proponents of the argument might
think) are not “real”. Hence, if we respect both the “unreal could
not be used” and the “real are substantial, controversial, etc.”
© G.C. Goddu. Informal Logic, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2014), pp. 62-76.
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aspects of Hamby’s demarcation, then actually used trivial
arguments will count as both “real” and not “real”, which is a
theoretical non-starter. But if we can only respect at most one
aspect, which should it be?
Suppose that there is an objective fact of the matter,
independent of our attitudes, whether a given argument is
substantive (or controversial or relevant) or not. Suppose further
that at least some of the criticisms charging actual arguments
used in argumentative contexts with being trivial are correct. If
actual use in an argumentative context is sufficient for an
argument to count as “real”, then Hamby needs to drop the
descriptors “relevant”, “substantial”, “controversial”, etc., since
arguments that fail to meet these criteria have actually been used
in practice (and have been criticized for failing to meet these
criteria). For example, at least part of Donald Davidson’s
argument (Davidson, 1973) against conceptual schemes is that,
understood in a particular way, the claim the conceptual
relativists are arguing for is trivial or uncontroversial. But if
Davidson is right that the claim being argued for is trivial or
uncontroversial, then we have actual arguments (and so “real”
arguments) concerning what is trivial or uncontroversial. More
generally, to deny that any actual arguments have been made for
what is trivial or uncontroversial—to claim that “preaching to
the choir” has never occurred in argumentative contexts—seems
problematic at best.
On the other hand, if actual “real” arguments must not
only be actually used, but also be substantive or relevant or
concern what is controversial, then, assuming Davidson is right,
the conceptual relativists were not giving “real” arguments; nor,
if the critics of Aquinas are right, was Aquinas giving a “real”
argument for the possibility of two angels occupying the same
space. But charging arguers with arguing for something already
accepted or uninteresting has a long history. If, however, these
arguments are not “real”, and the focus of basic reasoning
courses is supposed to be “real” arguments, then teaching these
arguments (and the general “show arguing for something
uninteresting” strategy) is also not proper in a basic reasoning
class. That seems wrong. If these arguments are reasonable
targets of instruction and criticism despite not being “real”, then
once again Hamby’s motivation for making the distinction is not
lining up with the proffered distinction, and I have no idea why
we are trying to distinguish “real” arguments from non-“real”
ones.
Suppose instead that an argument being substantive or
controversial or relevant for at least one individual is sufficient
© G.C. Goddu. Informal Logic, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2014), pp. 62-76.
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to make the argument “real”. Presuming that the conceptual
relativist or Aquinas took their arguments seriously, their
arguments would count as “real”. More generally, we must
separate out our collective judgments of arguments being
substantive from what proponents (or receivers) of the
arguments might believe. An arguer (or a receiver) believing
that an argument has substance or argues for a controversial
claim is, on the current supposition, enough to make an
argument “real”. But one might wonder whether any argument
will be excluded on such a liberal understanding of substantial
or controversial, etc. Assuming that all actually used arguments
have at least one individual who takes them seriously, then all
actually used arguments will count as “real”, regardless of how
insubstantial or trivial they might seem to us. But given that we
are not merely interested in arguments that actually have been
made, but the ones that could be made, I suspect the exclusion
problem will only get worse. I turn next to arguments that
“could be made in the context of judging what to do or believe”.
Recall that according to Hamby, “real” arguments are
ones that “could be offered in practice to support a controversial
candidate claim that calls for judgment in the context of
deciding what to believe or do”(Hamby 2012, p. 313), or “could
serve as a tool of persuasion or for some other use in the context
of the communicative practice of establishing good candidates
for belief and action”(p. 321); whereas non-“real” arguments are
“instances of genuine arguments that are not used, nor could
prospectively be used, to some end of argumentation in the
practice of forming beliefs and deciding what to do”(p. 324).
Hamby argues that there are genuine arguments on both sides of
the “could be used/could not be used” divide. I shall argue that
interpreting the divide so that there are arguments on both sides
will make the divide theoretically irrelevant. Attempting to
avoid the charge of irrelevance will require making the “could
not be used” side of the divide empty. But if one side of the
divide is empty, then the divide is still theoretically irrelevant.
Hence, either way, the divide is theoretically irrelevant.
Consider an argument concerning whether the sun will
generate an Earth threatening solar flare in the next 50 years.
Clearly such a conclusion matters to us and is significant to what
we do and believe. But also suppose that this argument, given
the complexity of the interior of the sun, has a million premises.
Though there is a perfectly coherent sense in which it is not
practical for us, limited as we are, to use this argument, it is
certainly an argument that concerns something that matters, is
substantive, and so satisfies most of the descriptors Hamby uses
© G.C. Goddu. Informal Logic, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2014), pp. 62-76.
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to clarify what a “real” argument is. So is this hypothetical
argument a “real” argument or not?
If it is not, because of the lack of “prospective use”, then
once again Hamby’s descriptors do not capture “real”
arguments. But more importantly, if it is not a “real” argument,
then the range of “real” arguments seems quite parochial,
limited by our current abilities and knowledge. Since Cicero
could not use any argument in quantum physics, does it follow
that they were not “real” then, but are “real” now? The
arguments that eight-year-olds can use are different than those
that many grown adults can practically use—so are the
arguments we can use, but they cannot, “real” for us and not
“real” for them and vice versa? Again, this sort of relativism is
to be avoided in our theoretical ontology.
If the hypothetical solar flare argument is a “real”
argument (or the eight-year-old’s simplistic arguments are
“real”), then we must understand “could be used” quite liberally.
If even one potential arguer could use the argument in the
context of deciding what to do or believe, then the argument will
count as “real”. (If we hold that an argument could be used if at
least one arguer [or receiver] holds the argument to be
significant or relevant or controversial, then this option lines up
with the option we considered previously.) But if just one
potential user is sufficient to make an argument “real”, then it is
hard to see what arguments might be excluded by Hamby’s
account. Arguments that seem inane to us may seem perfectly
substantial and reasonable to use for those less intellectually
perspicuous than we are, just as many of our substantial
arguments may seem inane to Laplacian super-geniuses. Also if
an omnipotent being counts as a potential arguer and an
omnipotent being can do anything logically possible, then such a
being could use any argument just so long as it was not logically
impossible to use such an argument. But are there any genuine
arguments that are logically impossible to use? Using them in
the context of deciding what to do or believe would entail a
contradiction?
In general the problem is as follows: in its most general
sense “could be used in the context of judging what to do or
believe” does not exclude any arguments (or if it does, I do not
yet know what these arguments are) in which case “real” is just
another word for genuine argument and Hamby has already
conceded that “real” arguments are supposed to be a proper
subclass of genuine arguments (Hamby 2012, p. 324).
Understanding “could be used” as “could be used by us (or those
intellectually like us) in normal circumstances” introduces a
© G.C. Goddu. Informal Logic, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2014), pp. 62-76.
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parochialism and relativism into our categories that have no
place in our theoretical ontology. Take all the arguments that
ever were, are, or will be and all the genuine arguments that ever
could have been or could be. Is there a genuine stable proper
subset of those arguments that are the “real” ones? That is the
generality we seek in our theoretical ontology.
I doubt that there is a stable middle ground. At the same
time, I admit that the examples in the previous paragraphs, while
suggestive, do not conclusively prove that there is no stable
middle ground for “could be used”. Regardless, if there were a
substantial theoretical payoff (or even any theoretical payoff) to
the notion of a “real” argument, doubts about a theoretically
stable use of “could be used” would not be enough to warrant
giving up the chase. But the advocates of “real” arguments have
yet to provide a reason to demarcate “real” arguments that
comes close to corresponding to what they think “real”
arguments might be.
Suppose for the moment, however, that we take up the
challenge of trying to find a sense of ‘could be used’ that charts
a stable middle ground between allowing in all genuine
arguments and being so parochial or relative in scope that it has
no theoretical merit. Whatever this alleged middle ground is,
Hamby has yet to find it. Consider his example:
Socrates was a man; All men are mortal; therefore,
Socrates is mortal.
According to Hamby, “this argument is not real, because it is
unlikely that anyone would ever use it to support its
uncontroversial conclusion”(Hamby 2012, p. 321). But “real”
arguments are arguments that could be used as tools of
persuasion (amongst other possible uses in argumentative
contexts). Even if it is unlikely that the Socrates argument be so
used, it still presumably could be so used and so fits Hamby’s
articulation of “real” argument. Consider Plato’s arguments
about the immortality of the soul and that Socrates is better
identified with that soul than his body. Now imagine a
contemporary of Plato trying to rebut Plato’s arguments by
appeal to common sense. He argues by reminding his audience
that all men are mortal and that Socrates was a man, in which
case they must conclude that Socrates is mortal. The audience
agrees and the contemporary goes on to use the conclusion that
Socrates is mortal to argue that Plato’s view about Socrates’
immortality, or that Socrates is better identified with his soul
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rather than his body (or the combination of the two) must be
wrong.2
Plato of course will not be persuaded by this argument,
for he will disagree with the “all men are mortal” premise. But
even someone who has heard Plato’s arguments may judge “all
men are mortal” to be more likely true than false and so accept
the “Socrates is mortal” conclusion, contra Plato, on the basis of
the other two premises. Alternatively, someone might
independently believe all men are mortal, but require convincing
that Socrates is a man rather than the son of Zeus and a naiad.
Upon being convinced of the man-ness of Socrates one could be
persuaded, on the basis of the two premises, that Socrates was
mortal. If even one of these potential scenarios is one in which
the Socrates argument is used in the context of deciding what to
do or believe, then the argument is, contra Hamby, a “real”
argument.
What about this even more implausible argument:
Lemons are red, so the moon is made of blue cheese.
Imagine you and I are trapped, or at least our online avatars are
trapped, in one of many possible online artificial worlds. Which
world we are trapped in matters, since the location of the
emergency escape override varies from world to world. I am
trying to convince you that we are in the “moon is made of blue
cheese” world. Since we both know that all the “lemons are red”
worlds are also “moon made of blue cheese” worlds, I can point
to the red lemon in my avatar’s hand and type “lemons are red,
so the moon is made of blue cheese” as a way to convince you
we are indeed in a blue cheese moon world, so we should head
to location z.3 But if the Lemons argument could reasonably be
used and so counts as “real”, then what arguments will not count
as “real”?

Or imagine trying to console a kindergartner, whose grandfather has
just died, with, “All people die eventually, dear.” Sad kindergartner: “But
Grandma is a person too.” “Yes, honey.” New round of tears as
kindergartner comes to the conclusion that grandma will eventually die.
3 Note a consequence of this example: trying to find an absolute,
objective sense of “relevant” is misguided—anything can be made
relevant to anything else. A more interesting question is: given a certain
context of fixed facts, is a relevant to b? See also David Botting, 2013.
2
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4. Mere Examples
I am skeptical that there are any arguments that fail to be such
that they “could be used, or even reasonably used, in the context
of deciding what to do or to believe.” 4 What follows is a very
general argument for that claim—arguing against it is selfdefeating.
I take the existence or non-existence of “real” arguments
to be a substantial point of contention between us. It matters for
what we ought to believe, given we are interested in the truth.
Suppose Hamby insists that the examples I gave above are not
“real” arguments. Or suppose that Hamby grants my claims
about the above examples, but offers yet other examples. To
convince me that his examples are not “real” arguments, Hamby
has to argue that the proposed examples fail to be “real”
arguments. I presume such an argument will go like this: X
lacks the properties required for an argument to be a “real”
argument; hence, X is not a “real” argument. But how can
Hamby, or anyone, make that argument without using X within
the context of deciding what to do or believe?
Claiming that X is merely part of the main argument will
not do. X is an argument and it is “used in argumentative
practice to form beliefs and make decisions” and so satisfies
Hamby’s account. But, defenders of “real” arguments might
At one point in his paper, Hamby takes me to task for quickly
dismissing a restriction on use like “reasonable” use (Hamby 2012, p.
323). I dismissed it only insofar as no articulation of what could be
meant by “reasonably used” had been offered, so no theoretically
relevant or significant definition of “real” argument in terms of
“reasonable use” has been provided. Hamby still has not provided an
articulation of “reasonable use” in his current paper. Surely it is up to the
defenders of “real” argument to provide such an articulation.
I admit that I was, and remain, skeptical that a theoretically
adequate articulation could be provided. Some of my reasons have been
articulated here: reasonableness, like consequentialness or relevance, is
dependent on our goals and interests such that an argument might be
reasonably used by one person, but not another. Also, the use of some
arguments in a particular context might be criticized precisely because
the use of them in that context is unreasonable. But if people actually use
such arguments and it is worth teaching students this sort of criticism,
then they seem a prime candidate for basic reasoning courses; and the
distinction, and the alleged motivation for the distinction do not mesh.
Finally, I am deeply suspicious of trying to build reasonableness in at the
level of our theoretical ontology. Reasonableness, in conjunction with
our variable goals and interests, is supposed to be a consequence of our
theory, not a primitive within it.
4
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respond, X is merely being mentioned or X is being used as a
mere example or X is not being used to argue for X’s
conclusion. “Real” arguments, in contrast, can be used to argue
for their conclusions. As Hamby claims at one point, “real”
arguments are “not constructed merely for the sake of
illustration, with no substantive content”(Hamby 2012, p. 322).
So “real” arguments are not just arguments that could be used in
the context of deciding what to do or believe; rather they are
arguments that could be used to argue for their own conclusions
and not merely used as examples or mentioned within the
context of deciding what to do or believe.
Firstly, I doubt there is a clean distinction between using
an argument to argue for its conclusion and using an argument
as an example. Here is an example from Roy Sorensen (1996):
Some arguments are composed solely of existential
generalizations, so some arguments are composed solely
of existential generalizations.
The argument is used to argue for its conclusion on the very
basis that it is an example of that sort of argument. Or consider:
Petunias prance proudly past the pool, so some “unreal”
arguments have absurd premises.
Suppose this is not a “real” argument. But then it is an instance
of an “unreal” argument with an absurd premise. Since the
argument exemplifies the conclusion5, it should convince me of
the truth of its conclusion, in which case we have an “unreal”
argument that can be used to argue for the truth of its
conclusion. Hence, according to our modified definition of
“real” argument and contra our initial supposition, it is a “real”
argument.
Secondly, adding the restriction that “unreal” arguments
are ones that can never be used to argue, except as examples,
does not sidestep the issues raised in the previous section. If the
Lemons argument can be reasonably used, in at least some
contexts, to argue for its conclusion, then I am hard pressed to
see how to construct an argument that could not be used to argue
for its conclusion in any context. What properties would such an
argument have? Totally (seemingly) irrelevant premises would
not be enough; nor would obviously false premises or an
obviously true conclusion, since what is obvious to us may not
5

See Goddu 2012 for more discussion on exemplification and argument.
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be obvious to others. In other counterfactual situations those
premises could be true and in yet others that conclusion false.
Unless we are going to rule dialethism (or the theological view
that an omnipotent being can do anything, even bring about
contradictions) out of court by fiat, we cannot even rule out the
possibility that someone might argue using contradictory
premises or argue for a contradictory conclusion. Once again we
are in the position in which we either make parochial restrictions
on what “can be used to argue for its conclusion” means, in
which case the distinction will not be part of our correct theory
of argument, or no genuine argument will be one that could only
ever be used as an example or merely mentioned, in which case
there is no distinction to be made. Either way there is no
theoretically significant subclass of the class of genuine
arguments that is the class of “real” arguments.

5. Conclusion
One should not think that I am denying that there are substantive
arguments concerning controversial matters, or that I do not
think that we are quite good at distinguishing substantive from
trivial arguments, or useful arguments from non-useful
arguments, or arguments that are more likely to see use from
those that are not. I suspect we are quite good at making these
discriminations and certainly good enough to make them such
that if a certain subgroup of such arguments meets other
pedagogical criteria, we could easily use such arguments as the
basis of basic reasoning courses, at least as taught in the early
21st century. But all of this can be explained by appeal to a
general, though certainly not universal, congruence of our
abilities, interests, and background knowledge and not by an
appeal to some underlying subclass of “real” arguments.
What I do deny is that we have any good reason to think
that our correct theory of arguments will have a distinction
between “real” or “practical” and non-“real” or “impractical”
arguments within it. Even if it turns out that there is a subclass
of “real” arguments, I still have no idea what this class is and no
reason to think such a subclass is theoretically relevant.
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